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HERBERT WECHSLER, THE MODEL PENAL CODE, & THE USES OF
REVENGE

ANDERS WALKER

ABSTRACT
The American Law Institute recently revised the Model Penal
Code’s sentencing provisions, calling for a renewed commitment
to proportionality based on the gravity of offenses, the
“blameworthiness” of offenders, and the “harms done to crime
victims.” Already, detractors have criticized this move, arguing
that it replaces the Code’s original commitment to rehabilitation
with a more punitive attention to retribution. Yet, missing from
such calumny is an awareness of retribution’s subtle yet significant
role in both the drafting and enactment of the first Model Penal
Code (MPC). This article recovers that role by focusing on the
retributive views of its first Reporter, Columbia Law Professor
Herbert Wechsler. Though a dedicated utilitarian, Wechsler
became increasingly aware of retribution’s value to sentencing
over the course of his career, using that awareness to guide both
the development and adoption of the MPC. Recovering his view
helps us to contextualize and perhaps even better appreciate the
current revision’s emphasis on proportionality.
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AMERICAN ORESTEIA
HERBERT WECHSLER, THE MODEL PENAL CODE, & THE USES OF
REVENGE

ANDERS WALKER♦

But [the Furies] have their destiny too, hard to dismiss, and if they
fail to win their day in court – how it will spread, the venom of
their pride.1

INTRODUCTION
With over two million people in prison and costs of
incarceration eroding state budgets, sentencing policy is rapidly
becoming a matter of urgent concern in the United States.2 To
address such concern, the American Law Institute recently revised
the Model Penal Code’s sentencing provisions, calling for a
renewed commitment to proportionality based on the gravity of
offenses, the “blameworthiness” of offenders, and the “harms done
to crime victims.”3 Already, detractors have criticized this move,
arguing that it replaces the Code’s original commitment to
♦

Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law, Ph.D. Yale
University 2003; J.D. Duke University, 1998; B.A. Wesleyan University, 1994.
I would like to thank Christopher Slobogin, Eric Miller, and Camille Nelson for
comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Richard J. Bartlett, one of
the original members of New York’s Commission to revise its Penal Code for
personal recollections, as well as David Badertscher, Principal Law Librarian at
the Criminal Law Library, 1st Judicial Circuit, New York, New York for archival
assistance. Further credit goes to the New York University School of Law Legal
History Colloquium, the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at Oxford University,
and the Saint Louis University Faculty Workshop series for hosting
presentations of earlier drafts of this article.
1
AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTEIA 252 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books, 1984).
2
See e.g. THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 1000: BEHIND BARS IN
AMERICA (2008).
3
The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Tentative Draft
No. 1, Part I. General Provisions (April 9, 2007), 1 [hereinafter MPC 2007
Draft].
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rehabilitation with a more punitive attention to retribution.4 Yet,
missing from such calumny is an awareness of retribution’s subtle
yet significant role in both the drafting and enactment of the first
Model Penal Code (MPC).5 This article recovers that role by
focusing on the retributive views of its first Reporter, Columbia
Law Professor Herbert Wechsler. Though a dedicated utilitarian,
Wechsler became increasingly aware of retribution’s value to
sentencing over the course of his career, using that awareness to
guide both the development and adoption of the MPC.6
Recovering his view helps us to contextualize and perhaps even
better appreciate the current revision’s emphasis on
proportionality.
Retrieving Wechsler’s retributive vision also helps us
reassess a central problem in modern sentencing policy, namely
how to constructively reconcile popular demands for retribution
with rational reform.7 Stung by the xenophobic prejudice of
Prohibition, Wechsler remained alert to the constitutive role that
criminal punishment plays in democratic societies, not just as a
modality for preventing crime but also as a bulwark of social
cohesion. While aspects of such thinking paralleled the work of
4

See e.g. James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 85, 88 (2003); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 17 (2003). Perhaps the most vehement opponent of the ALI’s commitment
to retribution, or proportionality, is Judge Michael H. Marcus. See, e.g. Michael
H. Marcus, Letter to Professor Reitz, October 4, 2003, available at
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/
homepages/SMMarcus/LttrToProfReitz1003.pdf. Markus Dubber, perhaps the foremost explicator of the Model Penal
Code, denies retribution any significant role in the MPC, arguing that any effort
to read retribution into the MPC is an exercise in “futility.” See e.g. MARKUS D.
DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 24 (2002).
5
See e.g. Kevin R. Reitz, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum, The American
Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Tentative Draft No. 1, (April 9,
2007), xxviii. Scholars who have discussed the history of the MPC have tended
to emphasize its treatmentist side. See e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal
Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
53 (2000); Sanford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code’s Historical Antecedents,
19 RUTGERS L.J. 521 (1988).
6
Markus Dubber notes that Wechsler “subscribed” to the “orthodoxy” of
“treatmentism.” DUBBER, CODE, supra note 4 at 11. For one example of
Wechsler’s interest in retribution, or the public’s “demand for heavy sanctions.”
see Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1961).
7
See e.g. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The
Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633
(2005); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code
Second Save the State from Themselves? 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169 (2003); Sara
Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Political Social Psychological
and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal)
Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997).
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Nineteenth Century sociologist Emile Durkheim, Wechsler’s
insights hewed even more closely to an earlier model, the ancient
Greek tragedy The Oresteia.8 In that play, Orestes kills his mother
Clytemnestra to avenge the murder of his father, Agamemnon,
only to then be pursued by the Furies of Revenge, or Erinyes, who
demand his blood. As the Erinyes close in on their prey, Athena
intervenes, replacing blood vengeance with judicial process. Yet,
even though Athena’s reform is a step forward, effectively
replacing the old system of vendetta with jury trial, she still
requires that the citizens of Athens pay the Furies tribute, renaming
them the Eumenides, or kindly ones.
Like Athena, Herbert Wechsler also recognized that the
furies of revenge, though they may have no positive impact on
offenders or crime control, had to be paid deference. “[T]he desire
for revenge,” wrote Wechsler in 1940, is “entrenched in the
general population” and cannot be ignored.9 When electoral
majorities opposed reform, argued Wechsler, it was the duty of
liberal-minded policy-makers to persuade the public, through
education, that change was good. When this failed and “public
demand for heavy sanctions” became “inexorable,” Wechsler
argued that voters should be accommodated – even indulged – lest
they spark legislative backlash.10
While the problem of backlash has become prominent in
recent literature on civil rights, it has not factored largely in
criminal law.11 Instead, criminal law scholars have tended to
deride the political process, arguing that it is “pathological” and
has resulted in the “degeneration” of criminal codes.12 To
ameliorate this, prominent scholars have argued against
democracy, calling for the abolition of “legislative supremacy,” the
surrender of criminal law creation to courts, and the creation of
standing commissions insulated from popular vote.13
Rather than decry democracy, Wechsler embraced it. To
him sentencing authorities should always place “the general
community” at the center of reform debates for it is the community
whose “values and security” are often what is most “disturbed” by
crime.14 Of course, this did not mean that liberal reform should not
8

See e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, ON THE NORMALITY OF CRIME (1895).
JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION: CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES 16 (1940).
10
Wechsler, Sentencing, supra note 6 at 473.
11
But see, STUART HALL, POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND
LAW AND ORDER (1978).
12
Stuntz, Politics, supra note 7 at 101; Robinson & Cahill, Degradation, supra
note 7 at 633.
13
Stuntz, Politics, supra note 7 at 582, 587, Robinson & Cahill, Degradation,
supra note 7 at 653.
14
Wechsler, Sentencing, supra note 6, at 476.
9
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be attempted, only that it should be incorporated, even
camouflaged, within larger initiatives that accommodated
retribution. To show how Wechsler reconciled popular demands
for retribution with liberal reform, this article will proceed in four
parts. Part I will recover Wechsler’s early criminal law thinking,
showing how he began to develop a sense of the intimate
relationship between democratic politics and criminal law while a
young Columbia law professor in the 1930s and a participant in the
Nuremburg trials in the 1940s. Part II will discuss Wechsler’s
application of democratic theory to the Model Penal Code in the
1950s. Part III will show how Wechsler applied many of his
theories to the revision of New York’s Criminal Code in the 1960s.
Finally, Part IV will examine the manner in Wechsler’s theories
inform recent developments in criminal law, particularly the
strange career of the death penalty in New York. This article
concludes by suggesting that both current criminal law scholars
and judges should not only look more carefully at popular views of
sentencing, but develop a theory of reform that brings democracy
back in.

I.

FROM NEW YORK TO NUREMBURG: THE FORMATIVE YEARS

Born in New York City in 1909, Herbert Wechsler
confronted criminal law’s direct, sometimes perverse relationship
to popular politics early on. Jewish by birth, Wechsler became
alarmed at the manner in which Protestant nativism led to the
criminalization of alcohol in 1918.15 Though the Volstead Act
provided an annual allowance of ten gallons of sacramental wine
per Jewish family per year, prominent Jewish newspapers like the
Jewish Daily Forward and the American Hebrew decried the law
as an infringement on their religious liberty.16 Such complaints
gained strength when dry leaders accused Jewish rabbis of selling
sacramental wine out of their homes in New York in 1921.17
Spurred by anti-semitism, New York’s Bureau of Prohibition
ultimately refused to issue wine licenses to Jews in the city,
prompting Wechsler’s family to defy the law “with abandon.”18
15

MICHAEL A LERNER, DRY MANHATTAN: PROHIBITION IN NEW YORK CITY 115
(2007).
16
Id. at 120.
17
Id.
18
Interview by Norman Silber and Geoffrey Miller with Herbert Wechsler,
Professor, Columbia University School of Law, in New York City, N.Y.
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While his parents broke the law at home, Wechsler came to
appreciate the obstacles that popular prejudice posed to criminal
law in other parts of the United States as well. In 1932, Wechsler
began a Supreme Court clerkship with Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
that brought him face to face with the vagaries of criminal law in
the American South. Only weeks after Wechsler arrived in
Washington, the Court heard an appeal from the communistaffiliated International Labor Defense, or ILD, of nine African
American defendants falsely accused of raping two white women
in Scottsboro, Alabama.19 The ILD won representation of the
defendants over the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, or NAACP, and waged a massive political
campaign to raise awareness for the “Scottsboro boys.”20
Convinced that litigation alone would fail, the ILD advocated
“mass action outside of courts and legislative bodies,” staging
protests, rallies and demonstrations to free the nine black
defendants.21 From 1931 to 1932, the ILD and its communist
allies held mass demonstrations in Chicago and New York, staged
a mass rally in front of the White House, and even sent the mothers
of the Scottsboro boys on a national tour.22
While Alabama’s persecution of the Scottsboro boys
reinforced Wechsler’s view that popular prejudice undergirded
criminal law, the ILD’s propaganda campaign awakened him to the
power of democratic persuasion. Not only did the ILD hold
demonstrations, but it churned out reams of propaganda in
publications like The Daily Worker and New Masses, propaganda
that, by 1932, bled into more mainstream publications like The
Nation, the New Republic and the New York Times.23 By the time
the case reached the Supreme Court in the fall of 1932, figures as
disparate as Albert Einstein, H.G. Wells, and Maxim Gorky were
speaking out against the persecution of the nine black defendants.24
While Alabama juries refused to reconsider the boys’
plight, otherwise conservative Justice George Sutherland reversed
and remanded the convictions of the nine African American
(August 11, 1978; February 23, 1979; March 12 & 13, 1982) [hereinafter
Wechsler, Interview].
19
HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL ISSUE, THE DEPRESSION DECADE 146 (1978).
20
DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 54-100
(1969); PATRICIA SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE: RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE
NEW DEAL ERA (1996) 87-8; SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra note 18 at 146-7.
21
SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra note 18, at 148; CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra
note 18, at 59, 141-3, 244.
22
SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra note 18, at 146; CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra
note 18, at 146-7, 248-251.
23
SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE, supra note 19, at 87-8; SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra
note 18, at 146-147.
24
SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra note 18, at 147.
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defendants in November 1932, ruling that Alabama had violated
their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.25
Though Wechsler returned North in the fall of 1933, he did not
forget the perverse relationship between popular prejudice and
criminal law in the South, nor the hope that such law might be
changed.26 In 1934, Wechsler came out in favor of federal antilynching legislation in the prominent Yale Law Journal.27
Lynching, a problem that had gradually been in decline in Dixie,
spiked in 1930 and continued to rise through 1932 and 1933.28
This violence led to a surge in anti-lynching activism as the
NAACP pushed for the enactment of a federal anti-lynching bill
and New Deal liberals like Will Alexander, then employed by the
Roosevelt administration, formed a commission to study the
problem.29
In a review of two books on lynching sponsored by
Alexander’s commission, Wechsler argued that “significant
reconstruction” of the South was necessary and that federal
legislation was “[f]ar more” likely to achieve reform than solutions
sponsored by southern states.30 In fact, Wechsler strongly
advocated federal intervention in southern affairs, noting that
federal prosecutors “answerable to Washington,” federal judges
“enjoying life tenure” and federal jurors “drawn from a higher
economic and social stratum,” promised to be more equitable than
“the southern legislator.”31
Of course, Wechsler realized that southern justice might
look very different if African Americans were allowed to
participate in the political process. In the same Yale Law Journal
piece that he attacked lynching, Wechsler also lamented “the
political impotence” that black voters suffered under poll taxes,
literacy tests, and other modes of disfranchisement.32 If such
obstacles were removed from black access to politics, argued
25

Id.
Wechsler recalled Stone’s attitude towards minority rights to be one of
relative “ambivalence” in the early 1930s, not truly congealing around the idea
of protecting minority access to the political process until 1938. This stood in
marked contrast to the communist intervention on behalf of southern blacks in
1931. Wechsler, Interview, supra note 17, at 154.
27
Wechsler, Review of Lynching and the Law & The Tragedy of Lynching, 44
YALE L. J. 191, 193 (1934) [hereinafter Wechsler, Review].
28
SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 244-5.
29
SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 270-4; SULLIVAN, supra note 19, at 24-5.
Interestingly, one of the authors of the Costigan-Wagner Anti-lynching bill
turned out to be Columbia University Law Professor Karl Llewellyn, a colleague
and former professor of Herbert Wechsler. SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 281.
30
Wechsler, Review, supra note 26, at 193.
31
Id.
32
Wechsler, Review, supra note 26, at 191; State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
26
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Wechsler, then criminal law might be reformed from the ground
up.33
Wechsler personally sought to facilitate such reform in
1934 when ILD lawyer Carol Weiss King asked him for help on a
Georgia case involving a black communist named Angelo
Herndon.34 Atlanta police had arrested Herndon in 1932 for
possessing documents advocating a black-led “revolution” in the
South; an act that led him to be charged with inciting
insurrection.35 While Herndon’s charge rested on his possession of
written material, a relatively innocuous act, authorities were aware
that he had helped organize a demonstration of the unemployed in
Atlanta only a month before, thereby evincing an arguably more
militant commitment to social change. Also, Herndon had been
involved in communist organizing in neighboring Alabama for
several years, and had even worked on the ILD’s campaign to free
the Scottsboro boys.36
Hoping that Herndon’s case might become another
Scottsboro, the ILD rushed to help Herndon in Georgia.37
Unfortunately, the group’s trial attorneys encountered an
unsympathetic jury at the state level, resulting in a sentence of
eighteen to twenty years on a chain gang for Herndon.38 The
penalty’s severity prompted Carol Weiss King to approach
Wechsler through a colleague at Columbia, in the hopes of
mounting a more robust federal appeal.39 Wechsler agreed and
ultimately dedicated three years to the case, working on it from
1934 to 1937.40 The assignment proved formative, an education
not only in the vagaries of constitutional law but also the
33

Wechsler, Review supra note 26, at 191.
Charles Martin maintains that it was Walter Gellhorn, one of Wechsler’s
colleagues, who approached him about representing Herndon. CHARLES H.
MARTIN, THE ANGELO HERNDON CASE AND SOUTHERN JUSTICE 140 (1963).
This contradicts Wechsler’s memory of events, which was that Carol Weiss
King contacted him, Gellhorn and Jerome Michael at roughly the same time
about aiding Herndon’s case. Wechsler, Interview, supra note 17, at 125.
35
SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra note 18, at 150.
36
MARTIN, HERNDON, supra note 33, at 10.
37
Id. at 12-14. See also, Joseph North, Angelo Herndon, Fighter, NEW MASSES
11, 12 (Aug. 21, 1934).
38
MARTIN, HERNDON, supra note 33, at 61; North, Fighter, supra note 36, at 11.
39
Wechsler, Interview, supra note 17, at 125.
40
According to some accounts, Carol Weiss King approached Gellhorn, who
then approached Wechsler. According to others, King approached Wechsler,
Gellhorn and Jerome Michael, who later bowed out due to his southern ties.
Wechsler’s account is that King contacted him and Gellhorn simultaneously,
and that he and Gellhorn contacted Whitney North Seymour. Wechsler
Interview, supra note 17, at 126. Charles Martin suggests a slightly different
version of events, based on Seymour’s memory, which is that he enlisted
Wechsler and Gellhorn to aid in him in preparing the briefs. MARTIN,
HERNDON, supra note 33, at 140-2.
34
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intersection between criminal law and popular politics. Though
only one of what would eventually become six lawyers on
Herndon’s team, Wechsler later confessed to having written “the
briefs in both cases,” documents that sought to undermine
Georgia’s criminal insurrection law as an unconstitutional exercise
of state power over free speech.41
Despite his best efforts, Wechsler’s first brief failed.42
Though the young law professor went to great lengths to show that
Herndon had not posed a clear and present danger to the state of
Georgia, the Supreme Court dismissed his complaint on the
grounds that Herndon’s lawyer had not raised the issue
successfully at trial.43 Undaunted, Wechsler began searching for
an alternate theory upon which to continue Herndon’s case while
the ILD engaged in an impressive display of popular politics, or
what it called “mass pressure” to stoke popular support for
Herndon’s defense.44 In the summer of 1935, the ILD arranged for
Herndon to tour the west coast, even building a cage like the ones
used to house prisoners on Georgia chain gangs to accompany
him.45 In October of that year, the ILD held a mass demonstration
in New York during which Herndon himself argued that the
Supreme Court had denied his appeal not on legal deficiencies but
in order to keep “white and Negro workers from organizing” in the
41

During his interviews with Silber and Miller, Wechsler recalled writing the
“bulk” of Herndon’s legal briefs himself. Wechsler, Interview, supra note 17, at
125-7. During his testimony before the subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 1944, however, he confessed to having researched and written
“the briefs in both cases.” Statement of Herbert Wechsler, “Nomination of
Herbert Wechsler,of New York, to be Assistant Attorney General,” U.S. Senate
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, May 29, 1944, 75, 78.
Atlanta attorneys Elbert Tuttle and William A. Sutherland also participated in
the case, though Wechsler remembered them to be involved primarily in
Herndon’s second appeal. Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Georgia, 295
U.S. 441 (1935) (No. 665).
42
Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935).
43
Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) (No. 665).
44
Interestingly, the rise of fascism abroad seemed to help activists like Herndon
at home as well. In April 1936, for example, not long after Hitler mobilized
German troops in the Rhineland, anti-war protests broke out on college and high
school campuses across the United States. Nation’s Students Join Peace Rallies,
N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1936, at 14. Though unrelated to race, the protests did
have implications for free speech as students promised not to strike at those
institutions allowing them to “express their views without censorship” many
taking “Oxford” oaths not to fight in future wars. Id. Angelo Herndon, in a
testament to his growing notoriety, spoke at one such rally held by Yale
University. Id. Herndon also addressed a crowd of over 20,000 people at
Madison Square Garden in New York City in November 1936, denouncing
racism in the South and fascism abroad. Fascism is Issue, Browder Contends,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1936, at 18. See GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING
DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 67-105, 112-154 (2008).
45
MARTIN, HERNDON, supra note 33, at 154.
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Deep South.46 Herndon’s fusion of the black struggle in the South
with the struggle of labor generally cast his own case in a more
broad-based light, one that implicated the Supreme Court’s initial
decision against him as part of a larger move to suppress labor and
the New Deal.47
Though it is impossible to know whether the ILD’s tactics
had an effect on the nation’s highest tribunal, the Supreme Court
did agree to rehear Herndon’s case in April 1937.48 The reason for
the rehearing was a Georgia law unearthed by Wechsler that
provided an appeal in cases where a statute’s constitutionality had
not been raised appropriately at the state level.49 This resolved the
technical deficiency in Herndon’s initial petition, namely that he
had failed to raise a constitutional objection to Georgia’s
insurrection statute at the trial level.50 However, the question of
whether such an objection should, or for that matter even could
have been raised was debatable. The trial judge had actually agreed
with Herndon’s attorneys on the constitutional interpretation of the
statute in question, namely that it only imposed liability when the
accused represented an imminent danger to the state.51 It was a
surprise to Herndon then when the Georgia Supreme Court
reinterpreted the statute against him, holding that it not only
punished offenders for risking imminent overthrow of the
government, but overthrow of the state at “any time,” thereby
raising a constitutional question that Herndon had not
anticipated.52 In a manner that reflected bias against Herndon, the
United States Supreme Court held that Herndon should have
predicted the Georgia Supreme Court was going to reinterpret the
statute against him based on two of its past opinions, neither of
which dealt with similar facts.53 To Wechsler’s mind, this holding
was suspect, indicating possible bias on the Court. Convinced that
Herndon should be free, he decided to go back through Georgia’s
statutes to find grounds for a second appeal, ultimately discovering
a habeas petition keeping federal challenges to state statutes open,
46

Herndon Cheered as Martyr by 2,000, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1935, at 15.
Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Mass Politics in the Making of the Civil Rights
Lawyer, 1931-1941, 93 J. OF AMERICAN HIST. 44-6 (2006); SITKOFF, NEW
DEAL, supra note 18, at 148-9.
48
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). For a discussion of Lowry’s
significance, see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS
375 (1997); and HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN AMERICA 169-175 (1988).
49
Wechsler, Interview, supra note 17, at 75.
50
Georgia, 295 U.S. at 448-9.
51
Justice Cardozo found the Court’s refusal to hear Herndon’s case to be a
procedural dodge. See, Cardozo, dissenting, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441
at 447-449.
52
Georgia, 295 U.S. at 445-6. .
53
Georgia, 295 U.S. at 444.
47
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even when the statute’s constitutionality had not been raised at
trial.
After three years of pressure from the ILD, the Court
agreed to rehear Herndon’s case. And, in 1937, he won.54
Communists rejoiced.55 “Herndon is Free!” proclaimed the
communist paper The New Masses, praising the “mass pressure”
that the ILD had applied on his behalf.56 “[H]ow come this change
in attitude of the court?” asked New Masses writer Joseph North.57
“The answer,” North continued, was not in Wechsler’s skill as an
attorney, but in the “tidal wave of labor organization,” the “surge
of sit-down strikes,” and the “growing unity of labor” nationwide
all of which “inevitably caused the Court to reconsider its previous
decision.”58
While it is unlikely that communist “mass pressure” alone
influenced the Supreme Court, changing winds caused by the Great
Depression probably did help Herndon’s case. In 1937, President
Roosevelt threatened to increase the number of justices on the
Supreme Court by appointing judges sympathetic to the New Deal,
a plan that the President announced on the same day that
Herndon’s second appeal went up for oral argument.59 FDR’s
court-packing plan coincided with a dramatic spike in the power of
labor unions and “labor’s rights” following the presidential
election of 1936.60 Wechsler capitalized on this surge by deemphasizing Herndon’s racial identity in his second brief,
meanwhile stressing his labor credentials.61 He lifted a discussion
54

Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. at 242.
Lowry, 301 U.S. at 242.
56
Joseph North, Herndon is Free! 23 NEW MASSES, May 11, 1937, at 13.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Historians of the Herndon case place considerable weight on the courtpacking plan as the deciding factor in Herndon’s victory. See for example
MARTIN, HERNDON, supra note 33, at 182; Sitkoff, New Deal, 151. On the same
day that Lowry came up for oral argument, President Roosevelt publicly
announced a plan to pack the Court with a new justice for every judge on the
bench who was over seventy. This “court-packing plan” as it came to be known,
sought to pressure the Justices into endorsing ambitious New Deal programs that
pushed traditional boundaries of federal power. To many, the plan also pushed
the Court to take a different view of cases brought by minority plaintiffs seeking
civil rights like Angelo Herndon. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME
COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT
186, 231-8 (1995); MARTIN, HERNDON, supra note 33, at 182.
60
Again, I borrow the term “labor’s rights” from Risa Goluboff, who charts a
move towards upholding the rights of labor on the Court in the late 1930s. RISA
GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 30-1 (2007).
61
Another possibility, of course, is that Roberts ruled differently because
Wechsler found a more solid basis for the appeal. Thanks to his own research,
for example, Wechsler found a clear statutory basis for challenging the
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of the demonstration that Herndon had organized in Atlanta out of
the footnotes and into the main text, making sure to note that
Herndon had been demonstrating not just for blacks but for
“unemployment relief” and “unemployment insurance” for all
workers.62 Further, Wechsler made sure to argue that while some
of Herndon’s literature advocated the creation of a black state, a
terrifying proposition to southern whites, the sum of Herndon’s
material merely endorsed the “peaceful organization of the
unemployed.”63
Despite the lawyering skills that he brought to the case,
Wechsler left Herndon agreeing with the ILD that the “winds” of
politics had decided the ultimate outcome.64 This reaffirmed his
belief that politics, not principal undergirded criminal law, and that
popular opinion could dramatically alter the kinds of sentences that
defendants received. As popular opinion shifted in favor of labor
and labor’s rights, the Court found new reason to review
Herndon’s case, ultimately releasing him from a Georgia chain
gang.
Similar types of nullification, believed Wechsler, emerged
in other contexts as well, particularly cases involving the death
penalty. In a 1937 article co-written with Columbia Law professor
and colleague Jerome Michael, Wechsler argued that “there is a
point” at which “severe penalties” like death might actually stir “a
sympathy for those accused of crime,” leading to “nullification” of
the law by jurors, witnesses, and prosecutors.65 This view, which
Wechsler invoked as part of a larger argument about the need to
lower the severity of punishment to fit individual crimes, reflected
a sensitivity to the democratic politics of criminal law, particularly
the manner in which both jurors and prosecutors could manipulate
sentencing outcomes to coincide with popular sentiment. Indeed,
it suggests that Wechsler understood criminal law to be a relatively
fragile legal edifice subject to “nullification” by actors who were
neither judges nor legislators, but still had the power to influence
sentencing.
How might non-judicial/non-legislative actors control, or
“nullify” sentencing? Prosecutors could simply decide not to
had expressed sympathy for minority clients and civil liberties in the past, this
alone might have pushed them to decide in Herndon’s favor. Barry Cushman
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prosecute cases, even if there was sufficient evidence to proceed.
Witnesses, meanwhile, could refuse to testify while jurors, long
celebrated for their nullification power, could simply refuse to
convict. Though Wechsler did not provide specific examples of
the above happening in the United States in the 1930s, he probably
did not have to. The nation had only recently given up its attempt
to criminalize alcohol consumption, a fiasco that had led to
rampant lawbreaking nationwide.66
Popular rejection of
Prohibition was so bad in fact that it had led to a dramatic rise in
organized crime and state sponsored corruption, a phenomenon
that spurred governmental investigations into both criminal
organization and police in the 1930s.67 As the government focused
its attention on stopping crime, the public developed a bizarre
affinity for “celebrity bandits,” men like Alphonse Capone and
John Dillinger who flaunted criminal law.68 To a law professor
writing in 1937, four years after Prohibition had been repealed, the
idea that popular sympathy for criminals might nullify criminal
law was not strange. In fact, popular sympathy for criminals had
led President Roosevelt to campaign successfully for re-amending
the Constitution and restoring legality to alcohol.
Another factor that might have contributed to Wechsler’s
fear that the public might reduce punishments and nullify the law
was the persistence of the Great Depression. By 1937, the United
States had entered its seventh year of an economic crisis marked
by unprecedented unemployment, poverty, and popular distress.69
That such dire straits might have increased popular sympathy for
criminal defendants, or at least tempered popular demand for harsh
punishment, is probably reasonable to assume. Indeed, in 1936
divisions between law-breaking and morality became blurred as
autoworkers in Flint, Michigan seized control of a massive General
Motors plant, winning enthusiastic endorsement from proponents
of labor across the United States, even though GM branded the
strikers as criminals.70
Interestingly, even as Wechsler feared that harsh
punishment might lead to nullification by a downtrodden public, he
also became concerned that an overly liberal application of the
death penalty might harm public morals. “It is at least arguable,”
noted Wechsler in 1937, that the “use of the death penalty” may
actually “brutalize” the “non-criminal population” meanwhile
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providing examples of “the very kinds of behavior” that the
punishment is designed to deter.71 To provide support for this
theory, Wechsler cited the execution of Ruth Snyder, a New York
woman convicted of murdering her husband just prior to the stock
market crash in 1929, with the help of a paramour named Henry
Judd Gray. Partly due to the dramatic nature of the crime,
committed with blunt sash weights, newspapers focused on the
case for months, eventually describing Mrs. Snyder’s death in
meticulous detail. For example, the New York Times noted that
Snyder entered the “death chamber” with her “face tearful and eyes
aghast,” only to start begging for mercy once a “black leather
mask” was placed over her face.72
Wechsler’s fear that such macabre attention to detail might
“brutalize” the population reflected a rationale for opposing the
death penalty that initially seemed different from the fear that the
public might nullify the law by allowing killers to go free. Among
other things, it reflected a paternalist concern for the public’s
mental well-being, a position that assumed voters were relatively
impressionable when it came to the gory details of death. At first
glance, this seemed to contradict Wechsler’s fear that the public
were themselves a threat to the legal system precisely because they
were able to nullify the law in cases where they believed that the
defendant, even if guilty, should not be killed. Pulling the camera
back for a moment, if the public sympathized with offenders
enough to nullify the law, how could the law then be in a position
to “brutalize” them?
Wechsler’s seemingly contradictory positions on the death
penalty maintained at least one common thread. In both cases of
nullification and brutalization, the intersections between popular
opinion and law were critical to assessing the success or failure of
formal legal process; in this case the administration of the death
penalty. Before states should legalize execution, for example,
Wechsler argued that they should try to gauge “popular sentiment”
even in cases where it was “rarely uniform.”73 What the state
should not do, he warned, was ignore popular sentiment and
consign the “question of punishment” to “the discretion” of
“administrators.”74 Administrators worried Wechsler because they
could easily thwart the “development and articulation of uniform
policies” that coincided with popular rule, and therefore possessed
a better chance of not being overturned by future legislation.75
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In short, Wechsler supported a democratically responsive
criminal law, one that sought to keep abreast of popular opinion
without letting popular consensus neutralize basic criminal law
goals like making sure that the severity of punishment fit the
severity of crime. In 1937, this democratic concern seemed to lead
Wechsler to come out relatively strongly against the death penalty,
both as a brutalizing force and an invitation to popular nullification
of the law.
Yet, Wechsler also saw a utilitarian reason for keeping
death alive. In 1940, Wechsler and his colleague Jerome Michael
authored a criminal law casebook that mentioned, in passing, a
rationale for execution. “[T]he desire for revenge,” wrote
Wechsler and Michael, “the belief that retributive punishment is
just, and the feeling that examples must be made of those guilty of
shocking crimes are to a very considerable degree entrenched in
the general population.”76 Recognizing that the public may want
severe punishments in certain cases, Wechsler and Michael
advanced a utilitarian rationale for harsh punishment, even death.
“Too lenient treatment of offenders,” they argued, “however well
adapted to reforming them, may therefore lead to lynching, selfhelp or indifference about prosecution which may be far worse in
their social consequences than the utilization of more severe
methods of treatment which satisfy the popular desire for severity
though they have no reformative capacity.”77
That light
punishment might lead to “lynching, self-help, or indifference
about prosecution,” was a remarkable claim. Not only did it
suggest that harsh punishment should be used to satisfy popular
outrage, but it seemed to contradict Wechsler’s own position on
lynching in the South. How, for example, could southern lynching
possibly be a result of too lenient punishment of black offenders?
Wasn’t the problem that southern whites rejected any semblance of
legal process when it came to blacks? And why why invoke federal
power to stop lynching, if all that was needed was harsher
punishment?
Neither Wechsler nor Michael were strangers to the kind of
popular justice that stalked southern states. Michael, who was also
Jewish, had grown up in the South. Born in Athens, Georgia in
1890, Michael was twenty-five years old when Georgia authorities
prosecuted and sentenced a Jewish pencil-factory manager who
worked outside Atlanta named Leo Frank. Accused of murdering
a thirteen-year old girl, Frank was found guilty by a Georgia trial
jury but questions about the evidence in the case prompted Georgia
Governor John M. Slaton to commute his sentence from death to
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life in prison. Outraged, a mob of private citizens, some prominent
Georgians, stormed the state prison farm where Frank was held,
kidnapped him, and brutally lynched him near Marietta, garnering
headlines.78
Is it possible that Michael and Wechsler, both Jews,
believed Frank’s sentence should never have been commuted?
Probably not, but their encounters with the South left an indelible
imprint nevertheless. Unlike reformers who focused exclusively
on offenders, neither Michael nor Wechsler would ever forget the
active, even catastrophic role that the public could play in altering
criminal outcomes, amending criminal sentences, or even
“nullifying” criminal law. Further, these lessons applied across the
United States, not just the Deep South. In San Jose, California in
1933, for example, angry citizens seized and lynched John Holmes
and Thomas H. Thurmond, both white, after they confessed to
kidnapping and murdering a young boy named Brooke Hart.79 The
lynching became so popular that California Governor James
Rolph, Jr. commended the mob’s leaders for being “patriotic
citizens.”80
Popular support for the death penalty molded Wechsler’s
thinking on the utility of retribution, inspiring him to assert not
only that soft punishment might lead to lynching, but that it could
also result in “self-help” and “indifference about prosecution.”
While lynching and self-help referred to the removal of the
criminal process by private individuals from the state, Wechsler’s
reference to “indifference about prosecution” was less clear. Did
this mean that if punishment was not severe enough then the public
might simply lose interest in the criminal process? If so, why was
this not a good thing? Had not Wechsler been disturbed by
popular fascination with the trial and execution of Ruth Snyder?
Or, had Wechsler come to realize that popular indifference to the
criminal process was a bad thing, a phenomenon that might
facilitate handing the reigns over to agents free from public
control, perhaps even some kind of “administrator”?
Wechsler’s mention of popular indifference to the criminal
process as a bad thing suggested that popular interest in the
criminal process was actually a good thing. In fact, his warning
that popular indifference could lead to “social consequences” far
worse than the harsh punishment of a small number of offenders
hinted at a positive correlation between the criminal process and
popular interest. Here, Wechsler’s utilitarian view of punishment
as a means of keeping the people vested in the legal system
78
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coincided with his earlier interest in the intersection between
criminal law and popular opinion, opinion that could either be
brutalized by the law or, conversely, nullify it.
Perhaps the single-biggest event that convinced Wechsler
of the uses of retribution occurred five years after he and Jerome
Michael completed their casebook. Following the Allied victory
over Hitler in World War II, former Attorney General Francis
Biddle asked Wechsler whether he wanted to serve as an aide in
the prosecution of Nazi high officials in Nuremburg, Germany.81
Wechsler agreed and for almost a year beginning October 1945
watched as American, Russian, British, and French prosecutors
excoriated Nazis in court.82 Two lessons stayed with him. One
was that retribution, not deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation
justified trying the Nazis.83 Two, the retribution directed at
Hitler’s lieutenants had a distinctly utilitarian purpose. As
Wechsler later remembered it, popular “demand for retribution”
against the Nazis was so great that it “rose like a plaintive chant”
from Europe’s “desolated lands” following the war.84 In fact,
retribution, or the prevention of private citizens from exacting
retribution, became, for Wechsler, the most compelling reason for
holding the trials.
“[W]ho can doubt,” he wrote, “that
indiscriminate violence,” indeed “a blood bath beyond power of
control” would have exploded in Europe had the Allies announced
that “no trial would take place?”85 The reason for trying Nazi
officials was not simply to punish them, but rather to provide some
“institutional mechanism” that would “reserve the application of
violence” to public entities and not private actors.86 The
prevention of private recriminations, concluded Wechsler, was the
most “constructive purpose” behind the war crimes tribunal.87
If Prohibition convinced Wechsler that politically
unpopular criminal laws would be broken “with abandon,”
Nuremburg persuaded him that retribution had utilitarian value.
Though there was nothing that could be done to German high
officials that would be commensurate with the harms that they had
caused, at least a formal trial promised to convince private citizens
81
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that they need not take matters into their own hands. This meant
that satisfying the retributive desires of average people was by
itself an important goal of the criminal process, regardless of the
utilitarian effect that punishment had on the offender.
Nuremberg formed the third leg in Wechsler’s triadic
vision of retributive utilitarianism. It reminded him that public
desires for retribution needed to be satisfied lest private violence
ensue and therefore complemented the lesson of Prohibition, which
was that public prejudice ultimately determined the contours of
criminal law. However, Wechsler never became a fatalist. Angelo
Herndon’s journey through the American court system convinced
him that even though popular prejudice determined the contours of
the law, that prejudice could be mitigated, even reversed through
political propaganda, agitation, and education.
Prior to
Roosevelt’s 1936 election, the rise of “labor’s rights,” and the
Court-packing plan, Herndon had little chance of gaining an
acquittal. Following these events, however, Herndon’s fortunes
changed dramatically. Whether the ILD’s political organizing had
anything to do with this or not, Wechsler became so impressed
with the organization’s approach to practicing law “outside of
courts and legislative bodies,” that he ultimately became a member
of the group’s legal advisory board.88
In the next section, we shall see how Wechsler’s personal
experiences informed his reform efforts, particularly his
commentaries on the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code.
Partly due to his work with Michael in the 1930s, ALI chose him
to serve as Chief Reporter on the Model Penal Code project. It
would prove to be a hands-on opportunity for him to apply his
political sensibilities to the reform of criminal law.

II.

POPULAR CONSENSUS AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE

First envisioned as a corrective to the common law in the
1930s, the Model Penal Code project finally gained sufficient
funding to proceed in the 1950s. Animating the Code was a sense
that criminal law had failed to stay abreast of modern
developments in psychology and the social sciences, becoming
over-burdened with idiosyncratic offenses lacking logical
definition. To correct this, the Code’s drafters devised a series of
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innovations that states could adopt as they pleased, depending on
how far they wanted to go down the road to reform.89
Assembled over a ten year period, the MPC abolished
common law notions of malice and reduced mental state to four
simple categories: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence. The MPC also simplified a variety of common law
crimes. Instead of battery, aggravated assault, and mayhem, for
example, the MPC simply prohibited “bodily injury.”90 Rather
than particularized offenses aimed at punishing recklessness like
“failure to protect [the] public from attack by wild animals and
reptiles,” “throwing knives or shooting at human being in course of
exhibition,” and “negligently furnishing insecure scaffolding,” the
Code simply included a statute prohibiting “reckless conduct.”91
Perhaps the Code’s most controversial innovation was a
focus on the treatment of offenders, rather than simply their
punishment. According to Wechsler, who outlined the basic
“challenge” of a Model Penal Code in 1952, the primary goal of
criminal law was to reduce crime by successfully treating present
and future offenders. “Treatment,” according to Wechsler,
included both rehabilitation and reform of present offenders,
through for example probation and parole, as well as deterrence.
“[T]he deterrence of potential offenders is a practicable objective
of their treatment” posited Wechsler.92
The MPC’s focus on treatment rankled some criminal law
scholars, most notably Henry M. Hart, who maintained that the
Code should balance its emphasis on offenders with a counteremphasis on “the aims of the good society generally.”93 Noting
that crime was different from other wrongs, or torts, because it
incurred “the moral condemnation of the community,” Hart argued
that substituting notions of treatment for notions of punishment
confused criminal law with the practice of medicine, doing a
“disservice” to the “purposes of law as a whole.”94 “The core of
the difference” between criminal law and medicine, observed Hart,
“is that the patient has not incurred the moral condemnation of his
community, whereas the convict has.”95
Hart’s complaints that the MPC substituted treatmentism
for the “conscience of the community” obscured the fact that the
Code’s Reporters actually did keep the relationship between
89
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criminal law and public opinion at the forefront of their minds.
This was particularly true for offenses that stirred popular outrage
but were otherwise victimless, like incest.
Positing that
prohibitions against incest “may have their justification” in the
“science of genetics,” Wechsler noted that upon close scrutiny
there was actually scant scientific evidence supporting
continuation of the crime.96 Conceding that many opposed incest
on the grounds that it encouraged “defective offspring,” Wechsler
observed that the offense could not be explained by “breeding
objectives” alone because it was not “limited to child-bearing” but
applied to couples who decided not to have children.97 Breedingobjectives also failed to explain why marriages were forbidden
“between persons not related by blood,” like “step children,”
“adoptive” relatives, and “daughter[s]-in-law.”98
Even data on whether parents who were related risked a
higher degree of genetic defects, argued Wechsler, was
inconclusive.
Although “consanguineous marriages” may
“increase the incidence of defective offspring” in the first
generation, he noted, this was only true if both parents carried a
“rare, recessive, unfavorable gene,” not common among the
general population.99 The probability of such a misfortune,
continued Wechsler, was “not significantly increased by
consanguineous mating” so long as the “unfavorable gene [was]
common in the population.”100 In fact, unfavorable genes would
negatively impact individuals whether incest was criminalized or
not. “[A]ny decrease in the number of first generation defectives,”
argued Wechsler, would be “balanced by an increase in later
generations,” as the negative genes of individual parents entered
the general population, raising the “frequency with which the
marriage of unrelated persons produces the unfavorable
characteristic.”101 In fact, “animal inbreeding” indicated that
“permanent favorable effects” could be achieved by “continuous
control of matings through successive generations” with an eye to
“elimination of unfavorable lines.”102
Recognizing that most voters would be reluctant to apply
theories of animal breeding to people, Wechsler concluded that the
crime of incest should be retained lest popular opposition erupt.
“Even if it were demonstrable,” wrote Wechsler, that incest laws
“promote no secular goal,” doing away with the offense would be a
96
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mistake given the public’s “intense hostility” to the crime.103 At
least some of this hostility derived from religious sources. “The
bible defines and prohibits incest,” noted Wechsler, so much so
that “modern legislation” forbidding incest “is largely derived from
canon law.”104 “The religious character of the prohibition,” he
continued, was most obvious in states like Rhode Island, where
Jews were exempted from prohibitions against “uncle-niece” and
“aunt-nephew” marriages “since such marriages are permissible
for that religious group.”105 Here Wechsler, himself of Jewish
descent, evinced an awareness of community norms as a guiding
factor in criminal law. To further establish the importance of
keeping local norms in mind, Wechsler articulated a general
principle of criminal lawmaking: “a penal law will neither be
accepted nor respected,” declared Wechsler, “if it does not seek to
repress that which is universally regarded by the community as
misbehavior.”106 No matter how irrational a particular offense may
be, in other words, community support for that offense justified its
survival.
Of course, if community attitudes appeared to be shifting
then reform was probably in order, as in the case of adultery and
fornication. Noting that prosecution for adultery and fornication
served several utilitarian objectives, including “preservation of the
institution of marriage,” “prevention of illegitimacy,” and
“prevention of disease,” Wechsler still lobbied for dissolution of
the offenses on the grounds that they lacked popular support.107
Citing two reports by University of Indiana professor Alfred
Kinsey, Wechsler noted that “a large proportion of the population
is guilty at one time or another” of adultery, while pre-marital
intercourse was “very common and widely tolerated.”108 To
further establish popular opposition to the offenses of fornication
and adultery, Wechsler noted that “complaints are almost always
withdrawn,” and sentences imposed “only in exceptional
circumstances.”109
Why be concerned with offenses that were widely broken
but rarely prosecuted? To Wechsler’s mind, the criminalization of
conduct that most people thought was acceptable threatened the
very legitimacy of the law. “Impossibility of enforcement” he
warned in the MPC Commentaries, tends “to bring the law into
disrepute.”110 Here, Wechsler flagged another reason for paying
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attention to popular opinion, one that went far beyond the
utilitarian goals of preserving or abolishing any single offense.
The legitimacy of the entire legal system, he implied, could suffer
if lawmakers did not reconcile criminal law with popular
consensus.
“Criminal law,” argued Wechsler, could not
“undertake or pretend to draw the line where religion or morals
would draw it.”111 Repeating his emphasis on the danger of
unenforceable crimes, “criminal liabilities,” that proved
“unenforceable because of nullification” argued Wechsler, should
be “eliminated.”112
While the desirability of elimination was easy to determine
for certain offenses, it was not for others. Abortion posed a
particularly complex problem.
At the time, an “absolute
prohibition” existed on abortion in the United States, with only
half a dozen states recognizing an exception “for the purpose of
saving the mother’s life.”113 Yet, illegal abortions persisted,
leading to over 300,000 abortions per year and the death of roughly
8,000 women annually.114 Though “ethical or religious” objections
constituted a significant obstacle to liberalization, Wechsler
suspected that “the weight of critical and public opinion” favored a
“more restricted application of criminal sanctions” than what was
then in place.115 This led the Reporter to recommend “a policy of
cautious expansion of the categories of lawful justification” of
abortion.116
Wechsler endorsed three instances where abortion should
be legal. The first included cases where the mother’s life was at
risk, an exception already recognized in some states.117 The
second included cases where abortion was necessary to “prevent
gravely defective offspring” including cases where infants were
likely to have “serious abnormalities” including “gravely defective
central nervous systems.”118 The third case for available abortions,
argued Wechsler, should be cases of pregnancy resulting from
rape.119 Popular support for rape-victims, argued Wechsler, was
relatively high. Evidence of this emerged in 1956, when a woman
from Philadelphia was denied permission to abort a rape-induced
pregnancy. The woman’s plight was “sympathetically reported in
the press” as an example of “an unrealistic legal requirement.”120
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Pregnancies resulting from statutory rape garnered a
different response. Noting that “some foreign laws” allow
abortions in cases of statutory rape, Wechsler worried that
exempting young consenters might “be misinterpreted as
affirmative approval” of a “practice strongly discountenanced by
substantial groups in society.”121 For this reason, the “issue was
left among those,” upon which the MPC took “no position.”122
Concerns that popular opinion should guide, if not
determine criminal lawmaking applied not only to abortion but to
the death penalty as well. Noting that “[o]n balance, the Reporter
favors abolition” of the penalty, Wechsler counseled that it would
be useless for the Institute to recommend ending capital
punishment given that “many jurisdictions will retain [the]
sentence of death” regardless of what the ALI recommended.123
Even states that decided to abolish the penalty, continued
Wechsler, could expect adverse results.
Indeed “some
communities” might even find that doing away with the death
penalty invited the “greater evil” of “private violence.”124 Here
Wechsler picked up on a point that he had made over twenty years
earlier, namely that private citizens might be tempted to take the
law into their own hands if certain penalties were not retained.
University of Pennsylvania professor and special consultant
to the MPC project Thorsten Sellin disagreed. In a special report
conducted exclusively for the MPC staff, Sellin argued that “no
good basis” existed for claiming that retaining the death penalty
would “prevent an outraged community from taking the law into
its own hands.”125 Though lynchings had declined dramatically
over the course of the twentieth century, Sellin argued, southern
states that led “in the total number of persons lynched” also tended
to be “among the leaders in the use of capital executions.”126
Conversely, states like Arizona, Colorado, and Missouri, all of
which had “experimented” with abolition of the death penalty,
suffered no surge in lynchings once the penalty was removed.127
Rather than reduce private violence, Sellin argued that
retaining the death penalty might actually increase it. Citing
several historical examples, Sellin noted that “the desire to be
executed” had actually caused people to kill in the Eighteenth
Century. In 1760, a lieutenant in the Pennsylvania militia became
121
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“weary of life,” and shot an innocent man in the street “in order to
deprive himself of existence” through state sponsored execution.128
Five years later, two Philadelphians committed murder in the
hopes that their own lives might be taken by the state. The first,
Henrich Albers “cut the throat of a twelve-year old German boy,”
so that he “might lose his own life,” while the second, “cut the
throat of his own three-months old son” so that he might “die by
the process of law.”129 Why murder others rather than simply
commit suicide? One reason was religion. “[B]y murdering
another person and thereby being sentenced to death,” explained
Sellin, one could repent for one’s crime prior to being executed
and thereby “still attain salvation.”130 Individuals who committed
suicide, on the other hand, remained guilty of a “sin more serious
than fornication” and would automatically be denied entry to
Heaven.131
Despite a lack of evidence that the death penalty reduced
private violence and in certain bizarre cases even contributed to it,
Thellin cautioned the ALI to think seriously before it abandoned
execution.
Proponents of the penalty were less interested in
statistics, he conceded, than “tradition and what we have earlier
called dogmas” rooted in the “feelings of the people.”132 These
feelings, recognized Sellin, could be “deeply rooted in a people’s
culture,” and hard to dispel.133 Only when popular opinion
becomes “so oriented” that the majority of voters “favor the
abolition of the death penalty” would political support for it truly
disappear.134
Precisely because popular support for the death penalty
remained high, the MPC’s drafters retained the penalty. However,
they did become interested in the question of who precisely should
determine death. Aware that both judges and juries could decide,
Wechsler argued that there were “strong arguments” in favor of
allowing judges to determine death.135 To his mind, they were
likely to be “less emotional or prejudiced” than juries, judicial
tenures were more likely to promote “equality” in results, and
judicial decisions were more likely to be based on “responsibility
and rationality” because courts “might be persuaded to give
reasons for determinations.”136
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Yet, Wechsler concluded that it would be “unwise” to make
any “changes” in the “prevailing practice” of leaving the
determination of death to the jury.137 This was because “many
legislators would resist” abandoning the position that “the decision
of life and death ought to reflect community, not specialized
judgment.”138
Legislative “objection,” continued Wechsler,
“should not be invited” unless reformers possessed a “strong
conviction” that whatever change in the law was being proposed
amounted to a “great improvement” likely to curry popular
support.139 When it came to the question of removing the power to
decide death from juries, concluded Wechsler, “[t]he Reporter does
not hold such a conviction.”140
Precisely because of Wechsler’s concern for community
sentiment, the Model Penal Code retained the death penalty and
the jury’s power to determine it. The Code also retained the
crimes of incest and abortion, though exceptions to abortion were
proposed in cases of rape, health of the mother, and genetic
defects. Fornication and adultery, by contrast, were completely
eliminated. Recognizing that the ALI made political concessions
in drafting the MPC helps to capture the manner in which liberal
reformers at mid-century understood Henry Hart’s basic argument
that criminal law should reflect the conscience, and condemnation,
of the community. Though celebrated for emphasizing treatment,
the Code also respected community norms, even those that had no
value to offenders. Perhaps not surprisingly, the completion of the
MPC gained headlines, most of them favorable.141
While the MPC Commentaries remain one of the best
windows into Wechsler’s thinking on the relationship between
criminal law and popular demands for retribution in the 1950s, he
continued to sharpen his ideas in the 1960s. Just as the Code was
completed, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller appointed
Wechsler to a commission to revise New York’s criminal law.
Records of Wechsler’s work on that Commission are perhaps the
best example of his sense that retribution had utilitarian value.
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III. REFORMING NEW YORK’S PENAL LAW
Inspired by the ALI’s work, Republican Governor Nelson
Rockefeller appointed Wechsler to a Temporary Commission to
Revise New York’s Penal Law on June 21, 1961, hoping that he
could bring his legal expertise to benefit the Empire State.142 The
1961 commission was, in many ways, a product of Rockefeller’s
moderate Republican politics, if not his presidential aspirations.
“The Penal Law and Criminal code contain archaic provisions
which should be modernized,” asserted Rockefeller in 1961, “The
volume of provisions can be greatly reduced and the procedures
can be simplified without affecting substantial rights.”143
One of Rockefeller’s goals was to make good on a
campaign promise to reduce crime. Though moderate, Rockefeller
had won the governorship partly due to public frustration with
Democrat Averill Harriman’s failure to control crime in New
York.144 In 1958, Republican Representative Kenneth B. Keating
accused Harriman of “lax and laggardly anti-crime efforts” even
implying that Democrats were reluctant to crack-down on crime
for fear that it might expose a “tie-up between criminal elements
and political leaders.”145 Such accusations were bolstered by the
shocking discovery of a mafia convention in Appalachin, New
York in November 1957, a meeting of criminal kingpins that
Democratic leaders purportedly knew about but failed to disrupt.146
Dismay at this discovery led to Republican-led investigations of
organized crime in the state, investigations that echoed national
Senate inquiries into organized crime by Tennessee Democrat
Estes Kefauver.147 Fearing Kefauver might beat him to the White
House, Nelson Rockefeller made fighting crime a central part of
his political platform in New York.148
In April 1959, Rockefeller promised to reduce a backlog of
criminal cases in New York City, even urging passage of a
142
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constitutional amendment permitting defendants to waive
indictment, moving them more quickly to either plea-bargaining or
trial.149 At the same time, Rockefeller endorsed more liberal
reforms like simplifying New York’s Criminal Code and
regulating police. Not long after becoming governor, he signed an
anti-crime bill into law that created an eight-member Municipal
Police Training Council assigned to “draw up minimum training
requirements to be met by every applicant for permanent
appointment to any police force in the state.”150 This rule focused
more on disciplining police than criminals, and coincided with a
concomitant move to improve the quality of the criminal process.
In February 1962, for example, Rockefeller signed a Public
Defender Bill into law thereby granting counties the authority to
abandon the practice of assigning counsel for indigent defendants,
providing instead a Public Defender Service.151
Rockefeller’s interest in criminal defendants, not just crime
control, coincided with the growing power of black voters in the
state. Throughout the 1950s, black emigrants streamed into New
York from the South, rapidly transforming the racial demographics
of urban boroughs like Brooklyn and Queens, and smaller cities
like Rochester and Newburgh. Though most African Americans
had abandoned the Republican Party during the New Deal, black
anger at Democratic politics in the Deep South following Brown v.
Board of Education created a window of opportunity for New
York Republicans to regain their support.152 “A wholesale
defection by Negro voters could play havoc with Democratic
prospects in a close election,” asserted the New York Times in
1956. “By defeating the ticket in such cities as New York,
Chicago, and Los Angeles,” argued the Times, African Americans
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voters “might throw each of their respective states into the
Republican column.”153
At first, northern Republicans sought black votes primarily
by promising to improve conditions in the South.154 In June 1958,
New York Senator and Republican Jacob Javits introduced
legislation authorizing Federal prosecution and investigation of
“racially inspired bombings” in the South, partly in response to a
string of bombings in Florida, Tennessee, and Alabama.155
Rochester Republican and U.S. Congressman Kenneth B. Keating,
the same Congressman who accused Averill Harriman of
cooperating with the Mafia, introduced similar legislation in the
House.156 Javits continued to support civil rights in the South,
entering bills calling for federal voting registrars, retention of
voting records, and making lynching a federal crime in January
1960.157
In 1957, northern frustration with southern resistance to
Brown v. Board of Education led to a Federal Civil Rights Act and
an ensuing Federal Civil Rights Commission dedicated to studying
problems of education, voting, and housing in Dixie.158 While the
Commission found myriad abuses in southern states, it also
uncovered problems north of the Mason-Dixon line. In 1959, to
the delight of many white southerners, the Commission began
holding hearings on housing and criminal justice in New York
City.159 There, it uncovered an uncomfortable number of abuses
153
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against minorities by landlords and, in a manner that would be
germane to Governor Rockefeller’s interest in criminal defendants,
police.160
At a Commission hearing on February 3, 1959, for
example, New York Housing Authority Chairman William Reid
testified that “heavy migration” of African Americans from the
South into New York “had hindered efforts to obtain and keep a
racial balance in most of the public housing developments.”161
Reid’s testimony was augmented by the testimony of former
Brooklyn Dodger Jackie Robinson who claimed he had moved to
Stamford, Connecticut because he was unable to find suitable
housing in New York.162 Several months later, in July 1959,
Police Commissioner Stephen Kennedy inspired outrage by
sending police reinforcements into the Brooklyn neighborhood of
Bedford-Stuyvesant, and the Jamaica section of Queens following
an incident in which two policemen were shot during an arrest.163
According to Kennedy, such reinforcements were necessary to
prevent rioting, a phenomenon that had not hit New York since the
summer of 1943, when a police officer shot an African American
soldier.164 Black leaders disagreed, claiming that police brutality
had become rampant, and that this was just another example of an
emerging, racially segregated “police state” in New York City.165
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The Temporary Commission to Revise New York’s Penal
Law emerged, in part, as a response to such accusations. The
Commission was deeply political and heavily Republican, at a
moment when the Republican Party was struggling to wrest black
constituents from Democratic hands.166 Members included eight
prominent New York attorneys, and Herbert Wechsler.167 Though
less politically active than many of his colleagues, Wechsler
brought a remarkably pragmatic approach to the task at hand. In
fact, during his time on the Commission Wechsler repeatedly
expressed a concern for negotiating public opinion – and popular
desires for retribution – lest the overall project fail. Wechsler
(1980). Earlier concerns had been half-hearted, at best. See e.g. Michael J.
Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV.
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articulated those views most forcefully in the context of revising
New York’s laws governing the death penalty.
In 1961, New York was the last state in the Union to
impose a mandatory death penalty for all cases of first degree
murder. To Wechsler, any move to alter this required holding
“public hearings” in order to build popular support for legal
change.168 Wechsler’s interest in holding hearings reflected a
democratic strain that ran through much of the commission’s
proceedings. For example, at a Commission meeting on December
8, 1961, Wechsler warned that the “controversial” issue of the
death penalty presented the Commission with a unique “problem”
in that public attention to it far outweighed public interest in other
aspects of the criminal law, notions of culpability, justification, and
excuse for example.169 To avoid jeopardizing important reforms of
the entire code, in other words, Wechsler advocated catering to
popular opinion on the question of the death penalty “so as not to
impede the progress of a lot of other work that will not be
controversial.”170 “My own view,” continued Wechsler, “is that a
careful effort should be made to separate these issues to which the
public and the legislature are to be really divided.”171
In addition to addressing controversial issues discretely,
Wechsler also suggested the Commission spend time educating the
public, preparing them for radical changes in the law before those
changes were actually introduced as legislation. “This is a[n]
opportunity,” asserted the Columbia law professor, drawing from
his early days with the ILD, to “educate the legislature and the
public and the opportunity should not be lost to educate these two
groups.”172 In fact, Wechsler took the issue of the death penalty so
seriously that he suggested spending the entire year on sentencing.
“This report ought to build up that this year thinking is about
sentencing,” Wechsler declared, “sentencing which is important to
the people of the state of New York.”173
Interestingly, Wechsler counseled against holding actual
public hearings, suggesting instead that experts or organized
groups be called, thereby creating forums not for the public to
168
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voice its views, but to be educated on the subjects at hand by those
with either training, institutional knowledge, or experience. “I am
against hearings,” he continued, “use available material. Hearings
can be used for public relationship reasons.”174 For changes in
sentencing, he suggested the Commissioner of Correction.175
Other possible speakers, Wechsler continued, included District
Attorneys and even clergy.176
Wechsler’s suggestion that only experts or authorities be
called to public hearings coincided with his larger belief that public
hearings be used not to allow the public to air its concerns, so
much as to pursue larger, as he put it, “public relationship
reasons.” Wechsler’s interest in “public relationship” resonated
with his interest in public education as a component of the reform
process. At every turn he anticipated and sought to preempt a
potential backlash, knowing that such a backlash could, even if
focused on only one issue, jeopardize the entire project. This
reflected a strategic approach to reform, an awareness that
embedded within the Model Penal Code were myriad reforms,
many of which did not, and probably would not, attract popular
scrutiny. Among these were the elimination of concepts like
“malignant heart” in favor of more precise, structured
constructions of mens rea, as well as the simplification of battery
crimes and reckless conduct.
Wechsler voiced some of his concerns about a
preoccupation with the death penalty ruining other reform
provisions on November 29, 1962, during the commission’s first
structured hearing. The topic of the hearing, held in Albany’s
Chancellor’s Hall, was a question that Herbert Wechsler had
suggested, over a month earlier: “Should capital punishment be
retained, limited, extended or abolished in New York State?”177
Among those in attendance were Reverend Carl Herman Voss
from the American League to Abolish Capital Punishment; Joseph
Ryan, District Attorney for Onandaga County, and Al Sgaglione,
President of the Police Conference of New York State.
Out of all the guests who spoke, only Sgaglione supported
retention of the death penalty in the state. “The Police Conference
is opposed to any alteration of capital punishment,” began
Sgaglione, “because of its great effect as a deterrent.”178 “Penalties
must be strong,” continued Sgaglione, “As we are all aware today,
174
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there is not enough respect for law and order in our great State or
in our nation. Therefore, in conclusion, the Police Conference of
New York respectfully urges this Honorable Commission continue
the implementation of the mosaic [sic] law: ‘an eye for an eye and
a tooth for a tooth.’”179
The commissioners jumped to grill Sgaglione on his claim
that capital punishment deterred crime. “[A]s you know perfectly
well,” began one commissioner, “deliberation can take place in an
instant. What I would like to know is when does the man have the
time to sit down and consider the deterrent of capital punishment,
in your view?”180 “Possibly after he commits the murder,”
responded Sgaglione.181 “After he commits the murder, then he
hasn’t been deterred. Wouldn’t you admit that?” queried the
commissioner.182 “He may be deterred from going further, from
killing a second person or a third murder. There is always that
possibility,” responded Sgaglione.183 “Why don’t you favor
boiling them in oil?” interjected Wechsler.184 “I think our society
doesn’t believe in that,” responded Sgaglione.185 “I wonder what
the line of distinction is, as you see it?” continued Wechsler.186 “I
think – I don’t have the facts with me,” countered Sgaglione, “but
every so often you read in the papers about someone who is
released; they have served a number of years for a crime
committed and they go out and commit a more serious crime.”187
“You also read about people who served and have been released
and go out and don’t commit crime,” countered Wechsler.188
“True,” answered Sgaglione, clearly flailing.189 “You know,”
continued Wechsler, moving to the importance of discretion in the
law, “the only state left in the Union – the only jurisdiction in the
English speaking world that has a mandatory capital punishment is
New York. Every other state has changed and you say you are in
favor of it.”190 “Why do you suppose,” continued Wechsler, “in
the last 10 years, 15 jurisdictions have given up a mandatory
capital penalty without any one of them returning to it? Do you
think that is an experience you ought to study before you take a
179
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position on this question?” concluded Wechsler, relinquishing the
floor to other Commissioners.191
Wechsler’s dialogue with Sgaglione indicated that he did
not place much faith in deterrence as a legitimate reason for
continuing the death penalty. Nor, for that matter, did he agree
that the death penalty should be mandatory. Yet, he still believed
that retribution had utilitarian value. Evidence of this emerged
during the testimony of Joseph Ryan, District Attorney for
Onandaga County, who opposed the penalty. Ryan began by
arguing that juries often let killers go free because they themselves
did not want to be responsible for killing someone. “The most and
worst that the death penalty accomplishes today,” maintained
Ryan, “is to whip up morbid curiosity in trials, creating a
sensationalism that is based on the primal urge to secure an eye for
an eye – a tooth for a tooth.”192 Ryan’s claim that the “most” the
death penalty did was “whip up morbid curiosity” echoed
Wechsler’s own warnings that execution might brutalize the
public, as it had done during the Ruth Snyder case. Ryan’s
argument that juries sometimes refused to convict because they did
not want to be implicated in the taking of human life, on the other
hand, echoed Wechsler’s fear of nullification.
However, Wechsler did not agree with Ryan that the death
penalty should be abolished. To his mind, keeping the penalty had
utilitarian value for criminal law, if for no other reason then as a
prophylactic against legislative backlash. To press this point,
Wechsler asked Ryan whether he “had any real cruel murders in
the last few years?” hoping to show that if the penalty were
abolished and a gruesome murder occurred, then voters might call
for an even more expansive restoration of execution.193 “I don’t
follow your question,” responded Ryan, “What do you mean?”194
To illustrate, Wechsler posited a hypothetical. “Let’s assume a
confession,” supposed Wechsler, “a documented confession and
there is no question of who it is in anybody’s mind. This is a cruel,
a bitter and unspeakable thing that happened. Now under present
circumstances – if you, as the prosecutor, could perhaps make a
judgment as to whether that was a bad enough case to press for a
capital verdict, presumably you would take some account of public
opinion as you appraised it in that situation.”195 Wechsler’s
191
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mention of public opinion stemmed from his longstanding interest
in the relationship between prosecutorial discretion and community
sentiment, as well as the larger connection between popular
opinion and legal authority. It was on this last point that he
pressed Ryan, asking him “what effect” not being able to go for
death might have “on public feeling” in cases of particularly cruel
murders.196 “Would it be a kind of sense of frustration?” wondered
Wechsler, “enough to incite new legislation?”197 To illustrate, he
raised the matter of Delaware’s abolition and subsequent
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1961.198 While forces
opposing the death penalty succeeded in convincing the legislature
to do away with execution in 1958, the state continued to sanction
public flogging as punishment for violent felonies.199 Then, after a
sensational triple murder one block from the governor’s house in
1960, the state legislature voted to restore the death penalty,
eventually overriding a gubernatorial veto to do so.200 “Why?”
queried Wechsler, “[b]ecause there had been a triple murder and a
very, very unforgivable condition so that any mitigation was
negated and just a sense of frustration of the community resulted in
this sentiment in the legislature. In other words, I put this question
to you because it seems to me the issue is trying to judge whether
abolition is really the most practical proposal to make in this
situation.”201
Afraid Ryan might not see things quite as
strategically as he did, Wechsler tried to drive home the counterintuitive notion that abolition of the death penalty could hurt
criminal law generally. This, ultimately, was its “practical” side,
its ability to assuage popular anger and legislative backlash.
Unable, or perhaps unwilling to see Wechsler’s point, Ryan
countered by asserting that the death penalty actually had an
impractical effect, namely that it pressured jurors to reduce first
degree murder convictions to second, simply to avoid being
implicated in executions.202
Such a risk would not exist,
responded Wechsler, if states followed the MPC’s example,
bifurcating their capital trials and allowing juries to determine guilt
in one phase and death in another.203 Even if jurors were not
“unanimous in favor of [the] death penalty,” continued Wechsler,
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“public opinion” could simply “focus on them,” not the criminal
code, for perpetrating injustice.204 Under such a scheme, “the most
you would have is an unpopular verdict,” argued Wechsler, “but in
an abolition situation, what you have is an outraged populace
turning to the Legislature and denouncing the law and a very real
danger that you may end up worse off than you started.”205
Wechsler’s allusion to being “worse off” alluded to the corruption
of criminal codes that occurred when elected representatives got
votes by promising to boost sentences and invent new crimes. To
him, this degradation of criminal codes had little to do with the
inherent nature of the legislative process, but a great deal to do
with popular desires for revenge stoked by liberal attempts to cabin
popular will.
Following the public hearing, the Temporary Commission
met informally and Wechsler alluded again to Delaware, warning
that abolition of the penalty could lead to an even more severe
backlash in favor of it, particularly in the aftermath of a
particularly brutal killing. “If the Commission induces the
Legislature to abolish capital punishment,” noted Wechsler, and if
thereafter several shocking homicides occur, state lawmakers
might feel that they were led down the garden path.”206 He
concluded that the passage of three bills would constitute a
significant step forward in New York’s reform effort.207 The first
was a “redefinition of homicide,” abandoning malice aforethought
for the MPC mens rea of purpose.208 The second was a bifurcation
of the criminal trial into a “two-stage proceeding” in which the
jury first decided guilt and then determined the sentence.209
Finally, Wechsler suggested abandoning the mandatory death
penalty and allowing prosecutors the discretion to request death.210
Wechsler reiterated his fear that abolishing the death
penalty might lead to a backlash at a second public hearing, also on
the death penalty held in New York City on December 7, 1962.
This hearing featured a parade of witnesses, most opposed to the
penalty. Among them were Judge Samuel Liebowitz of Kings
County, Senator Manfred Ohrenstein, Jerome Nathanson,
representing the New York Committee to Abolish the Death
Penalty, Norman Redlich, NYU law professor, and Monrad
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Paulsen, one of Wechsler’s colleagues at Columbia. “I think that it
is a very serious mistake for a state to abolish capital punishment
too soon,” began Paulsen, “even from the point of time of the
abolitionists. Because if you succeed by one or two or three votes
in abolishing capital punishment, what will occur is that an
outrageous case will come along and the citizens will be affronted
and the repeal will be repealed. We have a good many instances of
that sort in our national history.”211 “A very recent one in
Delaware?” interjected Wechsler.212 “Yes,” replied Paulsen.213
Paulsen recommended, as a solution, the MPC’s two-tier system,
which separated the trial phase from the sentencing phase in capital
cases.214
While Paulsen agreed with Wechsler that abolishing the
death penalty might lead to a popular backlash, not all the speakers
concurred. Myron S. Isaacs of the Urban League of Westchester
County argued that the penalty should be abolished because it
discriminated against minorities. “It is our view that capital
punishment today is incapable of equitable and impartial
administration,” maintained Isaacs,
“It represents, in our
judgment, a cruel concession to vengeance inherited from a time
when revenge on the offender was a primary aspect of the penal
code.”215 “Today, it seems to me that among the poor Negroes and
Puerto Ricans, that they are the principal victims of the death
penalty in New York.”216
Wechsler said nothing. His silence proved all the more
remarkable given that the rate of minority executions proved to be
one of the few aspects of the hearing reported on by the New York
Times. “Evidence that Negroes and Puerto Ricans have been the
principal victims of the death penalty in New York State,”
observed the Times, “was presented at a legislative hearing here
yesterday.”217
Wechsler’s silence on black and Hispanic
executions might have had something to do with his experience
confronting racial bias in the South. Minorities, he knew well,
fared poorly in democratic systems unless they could find a way to
appeal to majority voters. Wechsler himself had struggled to open
up such avenues of appeal in the case of Angelo Herndon almost
three decades earlier.
However, the task that the Temporary Commission faced
was not protecting minority rights against majority misrule, so
much as trying to prepare the majority for rational reform. For this
211
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reason, Wechsler showed less interest in disparate treatment data
than in the testimony of experts like Dr. Hans Kron, Chief of
Psychiatric Services at Sing Sing Prison. “If I have to express an
opinion, the murderer is the least dangerous of criminals,” began
Kron during the December 7 meeting.218 “The least dangerous?”
wondered Chairman Bartlett.219 “Yes, a murder is an isolated
gesture,” continued the French psychiatrist.220 The reasons for
execution, Kron posited, surprisingly, had less to do with
deterrence than with popular demand. “[W]e actually frustrate the
needs of many people when we will have no more public
executions,” asserted Kron, referring to the “Roman approach” of
public punishment for public consumption.221
“Do you think that this would cause general neuroses, the
abolishing of public executions?” wondered Wechsler, reaffirming
his suspicion that abolishing the death penalty could incite a
popular backlash.222
“I cannot say,” responded Kron.223
“Certainly that was a way for people to express their pent-up
feelings of hostility, their aggressiveness … That is why we cannot
afford public executions. We try to make executions humane.
There is no humane way to kill. I agree. I am French by birth . . .
[and] up to 1929, in France, executions were taking place in public
. . . the last execution which had taken place in public . . . was a
homosexual . . . He was executed in Versailles, which is a suburb
of Paris. You had these buses around the night clubs of Paris
picking up people to take them to the execution . . . that will give
you the idea of the deep meaning of execution.”224
Before the death penalty could be abolished, Kron
continued, echoing Wechsler’s own interest in preparing the public
for reform, people needed to be educated. “We have to educate the
public,” Kron explained to the Commission, “To abolish [the death
218

Public Hearing, New York, Minutes, December 7, 1962, RTC, Box 2, Folder
1, 242.
219
Public Hearing, New York, Minutes, December 7, 1962, RTC, Box 2, Folder
1, 242.
220
Public Hearing, New York, Minutes, December 7, 1962, RTC, Box 2, Folder
1, 242.
221
Public Hearing, New York, Minutes, December 7, 1962, RTC, Box 2, Folder
1, 245.
222
Public Hearing, New York, Minutes, December 7, 1962, RTC, Box 2, Folder
1, 245.
223
Public Hearing, New York, Minutes, December 7, 1962, RTC, Box 2, Folder
1, 245.
224
Public Hearing, Minutes, December 7, 1962, RTC, Box 2, Folder 1, 246-7.
Kron continued, discussing the public outcry in France when executions were
moved out of the public sphere and behind prison walls. “There was such a
strong demonstration, that the head of the Government at the time – it was a sign
of instability – to introduce a law on executions, that it should take place in the
yard of a prison.” Id.

37

penalty] immediately, that will be a real revolution. This is a
matter of education.”225 Perhaps ironically, Kron saw the manner
in which execution was conducted in the United States, behind
prison walls, in a relatively mechanized, impersonal manner, as a
factor which actually facilitated the administration, and
continuation of the death penalty.
“[U]nfortunately, when
executions are exceptions, as they are here, when they are
accomplished in a very discreet way, with nearly acceptable means
for many people, when Socrates had to drink the hemlock, that was
very acceptable, because that is nice, that was a nice death.”226
On the day after the December 7 hearing, the Commission
met again and decided to postpone a decision on whether to
abolish capital punishment, in large part due to Herbert Wechsler’s
concerns that it would only jeopardize the larger process of
reform.227 The Commission did vote, however, in favor of the
MPC rule advocating separate guilt and penalty phases in capital
murder trials, with four commissioners, including Wechsler, voting
in favor.228 Further, the Commission approved much of the MPC’s
law of homicide, a victory for Wechsler’s strategic approach.229
In the Spring of 1965, the legislature voted to adopt a new
Penal Law for the State of New York.230 It was, in many ways, a
victory for both Herbert Wechsler and the Model Penal Code. The
new law followed the Model Code’s rejection of the M’naghten
Rule, substituting for it the substantial capacity test.231 It also
adopted the MPC’s defense of extreme emotional disturbance, a
broader substitute for the ancient “crime of passion” reducing
murder to manslaughter.232 Although the new law did not follow
the Model Penal Code’s lead in abolishing felony murder, it did
limit it, to the specifically enumerated felonies of robbery,
burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and
escape.233 Sodomy, despite the MPC’s suggestion that it be
decriminalized, remained a crime; as did adultery. However, there
was some liberalization. Married couples were exempted from
deviate sexual intercourse, and sex offenses could only be proven
by a corroborating witness.234
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Perhaps the biggest liberalization was a move to abolish the
death penalty.235 In an eight-to-four vote, the Commission
recommended that the penalty be eliminated in all cases.236
According to Wechsler, who drafted the report, “the specter of the
death house” introduced a “morbid and sensational factor” at
criminal trials, creating the adverse problem of “sympathy for the
accused.”237 The state legislature agreed, with two exceptions.238
It abolished the penalty for all defendants except those who killed
a police officer “acting in the line of duty,” and for convicts
serving life sentences who murdered a prison guard.239

IV: REVENGE RETURNS TO NEW YORK
For the most part, the Temporary Commission’s close
attention to popular reception worked, engendering little political
resistance. “From both sides of the aisle today,” reported the New
York Times on June 4, 1965, “were applause and lavish praise for
the commission chairman, Republican Assemblyman Richard J.
Bartlett.”240 Precisely because the Committee had been careful not
to offend the public, even granting concessions to avoid backlash,
it had been able to achieve substantive reform.
Yet, the furies of revenge remained. Despite Wechsler’s
careful consideration of popular caprice, the Commission’s attempt
to restrict the death penalty generated a backlash, particularly as
crime rates began rising in the late 1960s. In October 1968, a
legislative committee met in New York to decide whether to
expand the scope of capital punishment.241 Senator Edward J.
Speno, the committee chair, announced that “many legislators” in
New York had received “heavy mail” urging an expansion of cases
where the penalty applied.242 Much of this mail had been triggered
by rising crime.243 When New York City Controller Mario
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Procaccino called for a “get tough” policy on crime during a public
hearing in Manhattan, including reinstatement of the electric chair
for murderers, audience members cheered.244 Conversely, “groans
and cat-calls” inundated psychiatrist Henry Peckstein when he
warned that “too much repressive legislation” could lead to a
“fascist state.”245
In 1971, state legislators extended capital punishment to
anyone who killed a corrections officer “while he is performing his
official duties.”246 In 1973, New York City mayoral candidate
Mario Biaggi called for the execution of “hired assassins,” “those
responsible for the killing of a witness to a serious crime,” and
those who committed murder during a “rape, robbery, or
kidnapping.”247 In 1977, such a law passed both the House and
Senate, only to be vetoed by New York Governor Hugh Carey.248
Four years, and four vetoes later, the issue remained electric, this
time with New York Mayor and gubernatorial candidate Ed Koch
declaring that whether the death penalty deterred or not, it “is vital
that society be allowed to express its moral outrage at wanton
killing.”249 In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals entered the
fray and overturned the state’s statute requiring capital punishment
for offenders who killed while incarcerated, arguing that the
mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional.250
Despite the court’s ruling, popular initiatives to expand the
death penalty continued into the 1980s. In 1989, a democratic led
assembly voted to restore the penalty in cases of murder-for-hire,
murder of police officers, murder of witnesses, or murder in the
course of a violent crime.251 Governor Cuomo vetoed the law,
declaring that even though life had become “ugly and violent” in
New York, capital punishment constituted little more than an “act
of vengeance.”252 Frustration with Cuomo’s anti-death penalty
stance contributed to the 1994 election of George Elmer Pataki, the
first Republican Governor in twenty years.253 Pataki campaigned
on a promise to expand the death penalty, something that no New
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York governor had done since 1977.254 On March 7, 1995, he
finally succeeded in reinstating the electric chair – three decades
after the Temporary Commission had tried to eliminate it – with a
new law creating ten separate instances where death was
appropriate. 255
Just as the political battle seemed over, the courts
intervened. In 2004, New York’s highest court invalidated
Pataki’s law on the grounds that it unconstitutionally pressured
jurors into choosing the death penalty by warning them that
offenders who did not get executed might be paroled.256 Though
Pataki moved quickly to amend the statute, he met stiff resistance
in the State Assembly, now controlled by Democrats who were
softening on the issue.257
According to Democratic
Assemblywoman Helene E. Weinstein, initially a supporter of
capital punishment, “[m]y vote 10 years ago was 10 years ago.”258
Since then, argued Weinstein, “new information, important
information, about DNA testing” and “about innocent people being
convicted” had emerged, changing her mind.259 Though she did
not mention the program by name, Weinstein’s allusion to DNA
testing referred to the Innocence Project, a program founded by
law professors Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld to show that a
surprising number of death row inmates were innocent of their
crimes.260
Though Wechsler, who passed away in 2000, would
undoubtedly have supported the Innocence Project’s work, he
might also have issued a cautionary note to anyone calling for
outright abolition of the death penalty. Based on his own
experience, death served an important utilitarian, if symbolic,
function. By satisfying popular demands for retribution in rare,
unusually “cruel” cases, it actually limited popular pressures that
might otherwise result in the degeneration of criminal codes. Such
pressures made themselves apparent in the four decades following
the Temporary Commission’s completion of the Empire State’s
new Penal Law.
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CONCLUSION
In a recent critique of the Model Penal Code’s sentencing
revisions, Yale Law Professor James Q. Whitman chastised the
ALI’s endorsement of retribution as a “distressing failure” in
criminal law policy.261 “Before we endorse retributivism,” argued
Whitman, “we need some thoughtfully worked-out understandings
of its dangers.”262 Among those dangers, continued Whitman, was
retribution’s synergistic relationship with “harshness” in
punishment, “propagandistically-minded leaders,” and “mass
democracy.”263 To Whitman’s mind, “mass democracy” produced
bad results, led to “the politicization of the crime issue,” and
should be curtailed. Declaring “legislative sovereignty” to be at
the root of America’s penal problems, Whitman called for nothing
less than the end of popular control of criminal lawmaking,
handing the system over to “criminal justice professionals.”264
Though Wechsler was just the kind of criminal justice
professional that Whitman suggested, he probably would have
balked at Whitman’s undemocratic approach. To him, the dangers
of retribution paled in comparison to the dangers of rejecting
democracy, provided that democracy could even be rejected. At
least part of Wechsler’s utilitarian endorsement of retribution
rested on his conviction that democratic majorities would always
find a way to override, if not eliminate, any kind of politically
insulated body of “experts” that took control of criminal law and
sentencing. Even courts could not fully withstand popular
pressure, argued Wechsler, noting that judicial bodies jeopardized
their autonomy when they decided cases that transgressed popular
will. “Only the maintenance and the improvement” of neutral
standards of judicial review, argued Wechsler infamously in 1959,
will protect courts “against the danger of the imputation of a bias
favoring claims of one kind or another.”265 Once the public
suspected that courts were biased, then it could demand the
appointment of new judges, the curtailment of jurisdiction, and
even the outright rejection of judicial will, all of which Wechsler
had witnessed in his lifetime.
Not only was democratic control over criminal law
impossible to eliminate, believed Wechsler, but democracy itself
was worth keeping. At the heart of all criminal law reform, he
maintained, should rest the well-being of the community, whose
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“values and security” are often what is most “disturbed” by
lawbreaking.266 This means that even if a punishment appears to
have no deterrent or rehabilitative value, it might still be important
for easing community outrage, lessening the chances that the
community will elect politicians even more eager to reverse
reform.
That communities across America have shown themselves
eager to vote in proponents of new offenses and higher penalties
does not necessarily mean that retribution should be rejected as a
matter of sentencing policy. On the contrary, if the public felt that
offenses were too numerous or punishments too harsh, then their
sense of retributive justice would arguably work the opposite way,
encouraging them to elect representatives intent on reducing
offenses and lowering punishments, not raising them. Indeed, this
is what happened during Prohibition, when states decided to repeal
the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, restoring legality
to alcohol. That Wechsler came of age during this period helps
explain his early fear that retribution might lead to nullification,
not increased punishment.
During his life as a criminal law reformer, Herbert Wechser
articulated a nuanced rationale for the uses of retribution in
sentencing, one that reflected a commitment to popular democracy
and rational reform.267 Recovering this rationale is important,
particularly given that the tendency over the past two decades has
been to assume that popular democracy is inherently incapable of
sustaining reform. As Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill argue,
for example, the “degradation” of criminal codes is near inevitable,
a product of the “inherent nature of the legislative process.”268 This
is because legislators “share a common reluctance to appear ‘soft
on crime’” and will therefore support harsher penalties and new
offenses no matter how “useless or even ridiculous” they may
be.269
Even a cursory look at Herbert Wechsler’s involvement in
criminal law reform suggests that this is not true. In New York in
the first half of the 1960s, for example, there was bipartisan
support for reforming the state’s criminal code. There was even
support for the elimination of certain offenses like adultery and
fornication. Salvaging this history is important, if for no other
reason than to underline the fact that popular attitudes towards
crime change over time, rendering nothing “inherent” or inevitable.
Just as the end of adultery was history-specific, reflecting changing
attitudes towards extra-marital sex, for example, so too is current
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support for higher penalties against violent felons and sexoffenders history-specific as well. While legislators have certainly
tended to endorse harsher punishments against such offenders over
the past few decades, this does not necessarily mean that they are
always afraid of appearing “soft” on crime. Certainly, they have
no problem appearing soft on adultery.
Assuming that legislative bodies operate mechanistically
against reform ignores history and leads to undemocratic results.
According to some criminal law scholars for example, the answer
to the degradation of criminal codes is to shift discretion away
from legislators and to “experts.”270 For others, the solution to the
“pathological politics” of criminal law is to abolish “legislative
supremacy” by shifting crime definition from legislatures to
courts.271
Instead of crippling democracy, why not look to the root
causes of crime, or to improving law enforcement? Criminologists
agree that offenders are much more likely to be deterred from
committing crime based on the likelihood of arrest, not sentence
length.272 This means that whether sentences are long or short may
actually be irrelevant to crime control – and academic calls for
undermining democracy misplaced. Perhaps scholars should focus
more on the development of more effective policing technologies,
not robbing legislatures of their authority.
Along similar lines, perhaps the high number of
incarcerations in the United States is more related to poverty, racial
segregation, and the failure of urban public schools than to
retributive sentencing schemes. Given that one in nine black males
between the ages of 20 and 34 is incarcerated, claims by scholars
like David Singleton and Augustina Reyes that there is in fact a
school to prison “pipeline” in less-affluent black communities
suggests that school-centered reform, not sentencing, might be the
appropriate locus for legal change.273 Here, policies like those
being employed by District of Columbia Public School Chancellor
Michelle Rhee, together with the enhancement of truancy laws,
removal of summer break, and extension of school hours might do
more to reduce crime than tinkering with sentencing terms.274
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Finally, why not re-imagine punishment? Incarceration,
though dominant in America today, is only one manifestation of
many possible forms of sentencing. Both shaming and restitution,
for example, hold the potential to satisfy community outrage just
as effectively as incarceration, particularly if backed by popular
support.275 Even if criminal law reformers do not have a taste for
such moves, they would do well to remember Wechsler’s rationale
behind the uses of revenge, and support the ALI’s recent revision
of the Model Penal Code’s sentencing provisions.
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